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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we address a problem of machine learning sys-
tem vulnerability to adversarial attacks. We propose and in-
vestigate a Key based Diversified Aggregation (KDA) mech-
anism as a defense strategy. The KDA assumes that the at-
tacker (i) knows the architecture of classifier and the used de-
fense strategy, (ii) has an access to the training data set but
(iii) does not know the secret key. The robustness of the sys-
tem is achieved by a specially designed key based random-
ization. The proposed randomization prevents the gradients’
back propagation or the creating of a ”bypass” system. The
randomization is performed simultaneously in several chan-
nels and a multi-channel aggregation stabilizes the results of
randomization by aggregating soft outputs from each clas-
sifier in multi-channel system. The performed experimental
evaluation demonstrates a high robustness and universality of
the KDA against the most efficient gradient based attacks like
those proposed by N. Carlini and D. Wagner [1] and the non-
gradient based sparse adversarial perturbations like OnePixel
attacks [2].
Index Terms— Adversarial attacks, black / gray-box,
non-gradient / gradient based attacks, defense, machine learn-
ing.
1. INTRODUCTION
Deep Neural Networks (DNN) are used to solve a wide range
of problems including the classification tasks. Despite the
outstanding performance and remarkable achievements, the
DNN systems have recently been shown to be vulnerable to
adversarial attacks [3]. The adversarial attacks aim at trick-
ing a decision of DNN classifiers by introducing carefully de-
signed perturbations to a chosen target image. These pertur-
bations, being usually quite small in magnitude and impercep-
tible, can drastically change the output of the classifier. This
weakness seriously questions the usage of the DNN based
systems in many security- and trust-sensitive applications.
In the recent years, the number of authors reported various
adversarial attacks against the DNN classifiers. The diversity
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of discovered attacks is quite broad but without loss of gen-
erality one can cluster all attacks into three groups [4, 5]: (1)
white-box attacks, (2) gray-box attacks and (3) black-box at-
tacks. The white-box attacks assume that the attacker has a
full access to the trained model and training data. Despite a
big popularity of this group of attacks, their applicability to
the real-life systems is questionable. The gray and black-box
scenarios are more suited to the real-life applications. The
gray-box attacks assume that the attacker has certain knowl-
edge about the trained model but there exist some secret ele-
ments or an access to the intermediate results is limited. The
back-box attacks allow the attacker only to observe the output
of classifier to each input without any knowledge about used
architecture or possibility to observe the internal states.
The existing defense mechanisms are also quite diverse
[6, 5]. However, the growing number of defenses leads to
a natural invention of new and even more universal attacks.
In the overwhelming majority of cases, the main interest in
the adversarial attack investigation is focused on the gradient
based attacks and defenses. While the non-gradient attacks
and suitable defenses receive less attention but are not less
dangerous and important for practice. In this respect, the goal
of our paper is to investigate a new family of defense strate-
gies that can be applied for both gradient and non-gradient
based adversarial attacks in gray and black-box scenarios. We
name it a Key based Diversified Aggregation (KDA) with pre-
filtering. The generalized diagram of the proposed system is
illustrated in Figure 1. The main idea behind the KDA is to
use cryptographic principles and to create an information ad-
vantage for the defender over the attacker. A secret is shared
between the training and classification stages. The secret is
implemented in a form of secret key used for the random-
ization. The system has two levels of randomization, each
of which uses its own secret keys. The classification pro-
cess is diversified in several channels with own randomiza-
tion targeting specific randomly selected features. To reduce
the negative effect of randomization, the soft outputs of multi-
channels classifiers are aggregated.
The main contribution of this paper is twofold:
• A multi-channel classification architecture with the
KDA mechanism as an universal defense strategy
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Fig. 1: Generalized diagram of the proposed multi-channel KDA with pre-filtering.
against the gradient and non-gradient based gray and
black-box attacks.
• An investigation of the efficiency of the proposed ap-
proach on the well-known gradient and non-gradient
based adversarial attacks.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces a new multi-channel classification architecture with the
KDA. The efficient key-based data independent transforma-
tion is proposed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical
results obtained for the proposed algorithm. Finally, Section
5 concludes the paper.
2. CLASSIFICATION ALGORITHMWITH KEY
BASED DIVERSIFIED AGGREGATION
The generalized diagram of the proposed algorithm is shown
in Figure 1 and it consists of five main blocks:
1. Pre-filtering F that has an optional character. The goal
of this block is to remove high magnitude outliers in the in-
put images introduced by the attacker, if any. One can choose
a broad range of pre-filtering algorithms from a simple lo-
cal mean filter to more complex algorithms as, for example,
BM3D [7] or based on DNN systems [8].
2. The input signal mapping into a transform domain via
Wj , 1 ≤ j ≤ J . In general, the transform Wj can be any lin-
ear mapper like a random projection or belong to the family of
orthonormal transformations (WjWTj = I) like DFT (discrete
Fourier transform), DCT (discrete cosines transform), DWT
(discrete wavelet transform), etc. Moreover, Wj can also be
a learnable transform or even a deep encoder. However, to
avoid any key-leakage from the trained transforms, we use
the data independent transform Wj in this paper. Thus, the
transform Wj is generated from a secret key kj . Along this
line, one can also envision, for example, the DCT transform
with the key defined sampling in the transform domain. We
will detail below the properties of this transform.
3. Data independent processing Pji, 1 ≤ i ≤ I serves
as a defense against gradient back propagation to the direct
domain. As simple examples of such kind of processing one
can mention a lossy sampling Pji ∈ {0, 1}l×n l < n of the
input signal of length n as considered in [9] or a lossless per-
mutation Pji ∈ {0, 1}n×n similar to [6]. The sub-block sign
flipping Pji ∈ {−1, 0,+1}n×n presents an additional option.
It should be pointed out that to make the data independent
processing irreversible for the attacker, it is preferable to use
the block Pji based on a secret key kji.
4. Classification block can be represented by any family
of classifiers. We consider a DNN based family.
5. Aggregation block can be any operation ranging from a
simple summation to learnable operators or special aggrega-
tion networks adapted to the data or to a particular adversarial
attack. We focus on additive aggregation to demonstrate the
power of a simple strategy leaving the investigation of more
complex aggregations to our future work.
As shown in Figure 1, in the proposed architecture the
principal blocks are organized in a parallel multi-channel
structure that can be followed by one or several aggregation
blocks. The final decision is made based on the aggregated
result. The rejection option can naturally be also envisioned.
It should be pointed out that the access to the intermediate
results inside the considered system provides the attacker a
possibility to use the full system as a white-box. The attacker
can discover the secret keys kj and/or kji, make the the sys-
tem end-to-end differentiable using the Backward Pass Dif-
ferentiable Approximation technique [10] or via replacing the
key based blocks by the bypass mappers. Therefore, it is im-
portant to restrict the access of the attacker to the intermediate
results within the block B (see Figure 1). That satisfies our
assumption about gray and black-box attacks. Additionally, it
is in the accordance with the Kerckhoffs’s cryptographic prin-
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Fig. 2: Local key based sign flipping in the DCT sub-bands.
ciple when we assume that the algorithm and architecture are
known to the attacker besides the used secret key.
The training of the described classification architecture
can be performed as follows:
(ϑˆ, {θˆji}) = argmin
ϑ,{θji}
T∑
t=1
J∑
j=1
Ij∑
i=1
L(yt, Aϑ(φθji(f(xt)))),
(1)
with:
f(xt) =W−1j PjiWj F(xt),
where L is a classification loss, yt is a vectorized class label
of the sample xt, Aϑ corresponds to the aggregation operator
with parameters ϑ, φθji is the ith classifier of the jth chan-
nel, θ denotes the parameters of the classifier, T equals to the
number of training samples, J is the total number of channels
and Ij equals to the number of classifiers per channel j that
we will keep fixed and equals to I for all channels.
3. RANDOMIZATION USING KEY BASED SIGN
FLIPPING IN THE DCT DOMAIN
The core element of the defense in the proposed multi-
channel architecture shown in Figure 1 is a data independent
processing P in a transform domain W.
In our implementation, we use the DCT as a W and the
local sign flipping Pji ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×n based on the individ-
ual secret key kji for each classifier. The term local means
that the processing is done only in some sub-band or block of
the input signal. In general, the signal can be split into over-
lapping or non-overlapping sub-bands of different sizes and
different positions that are kept in secret. In our experiments
for the simplicity and interpretability, we split the signal in
the DCT domain into four non-overlapping fixed sub-bands
of the same size denoted as: (L) top left that represents the
low frequencies of the image, (V) vertical, (H) horizontal and
(D) diagonal sub-bands as illustrated in Figure 2a. The key
based sign flipping is applied independently in V, H and D
sub-bands keeping all other sub-bands unchanged. The ef-
fects of such processing after the inverse DCT transform are
perceptually almost unnoticeable and exemplified in Figure
2c - 2e.
The corresponding multi-channel architecture is illus-
trated in Figure 3. For simplicity, as an aggregation operator
A we use a simple summation. For the pre-filtering F we use
a filter based on a difference of the point of interest in the
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Fig. 3: Classification with the local DCT sign flipping.
center of the window with the median value in the window of
size 3 × 3 around this point. If the magnitude of difference
exceeds a specified threshold, the pixel is considered to be
corrupted by the adversary and its value is replaced by a mean
value computed in the window or otherwise, it is kept intact.
Finally, each classifier φθji is trained independently as:
θˆji = argmin
θji
T∑
t=1
L(yt, φθji(W−1PjiW F(xt))), (2)
to ensure the best recognition in each channel under the intro-
duced perturbation.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
4.1. Setup
The efficiency of the proposed multi-channel architecture di-
versified and randomized by the key based sign flipping in
the DCT domain against the adversarial attacks was tested for
two scenarios:
1. Gray-box gradient based attack. As a gradient based
attack we use the attack proposed in [1]. This attack is among
the most efficient attacks against many proposed defense
strategies. Further it will be referred to as C&W. In our ex-
periment we use the C&W attacks based on `2, `0 and `∞
norms.
2. Black-box non-gradient based attack. As a non-
gradient based attack we use the OnePixel attack proposed
in [2] that uses a Differential Evolution (DE) optimisation
algorithm [11] for the attack generation. The DE algorithm
doesn’t require the objective function to be differentiable or
known but instead it observes the output of the classifier used
as a black box. The OnePixel attack aims at perturbing lim-
ited number of pixels in the input image. In our experiments,
we use this attack to perturb 1, 3 and 5 pixels.
For the fair comparison, the gradient based attacks were
tested on the classifier with the architecture identical to those
Attack type Vanilla
J · I
3 6 9
Original 21 21.2 19.6 19.4
C&W `2 100 22.42 21.3 21.04
C&W `0 100 24.58 23.52 23.03
C&W `∞ 100 22.8 21.39 21.21
Table 1: Classification error (%) on the first 1000 test samples
against the gray-box gradient-based attacks.
tested in [1]. The non-gradient based attacks were tested for
the classifiers based on the VGG16 [12] an ResNet18 [13]
architectures used in [11].
All experiments have been done on the CIFAR-10 dataset
[14] that presents a particular interest as a data set with the im-
ages close to natural ones. The CIFAR-10 consists of 60000
colour images of size 32 × 32 (50000 train and 10000 test)
with 10 classes. Due to the fact that the attack generation pro-
cess is sufficiently slow for all considered attacks the experi-
mental results were obtained on the first 1000 test samples.
4.2. Empirical results and analysis
The results obtained for the gradient based attacks in the gray-
box scenario are given in Table 1. The results obtained for
the non-gradient based attacks in the black-box scenario are
shown in Table 2. In both cases the column ”vanilla” corre-
sponds to the accuracy of the original classifier without any
defense. The row ”original” corresponds to the use of non-
attacked original data.
The analysis of the obtained results for the gray-box gra-
dient based attacks and the original non-attacked data demon-
strates that the use of the proposed multi-channel architecture
allows to improve the classification accuracy of vanilla clas-
sifier. This is quite remarkable by itself since it shows that the
multi-channel processing with the aggregation does not de-
grade the performance due to the introduced randomization in
contrast to many defense strategies based on gradient obfus-
cation or detection and rejection of attacked data mechanisms.
In the case of attacked data, the C&W attacks achieves the
100% classification error on the vanilla undefended classifier
thus showing a complete vulnerability of this deep classifier.
At the same time, the use of the multi-channel architecture
based on the same type of classifier with the proposed de-
fense strategy improves the classification accuracy to the sim-
ilar level of the vanilla classifier on the original non-attacked
data. In the worst case of C&W `0 attack, the classification
error is only about 2% higher than on the original data.
In the case of black-box non-gradient based attacks, the
use of the KDA improves the classification accuracy of the
vanilla classifier similar to the previous case. In contrast to
the gray-box scenario, the black-box attacks are not so harm-
ful against the vanilla classifier. In the case of VGG16, the
classification error of the vanilla classifier is about 60-80%.
Attack type Vanilla
J · I
3 6 9
VGG16
Original 10.7 11 9.2 8.9
OnePixel p = 1 58.04 11 9.5 8.7
OnePixel p = 3 72.13 10.9 8.9 8.3
OnePixel p = 5 79.02 12.1 9.3 9.1
ResNet18
Original 9.5 11.1 9.1 7.8
OnePixel p = 1 36.96 11.5 9 7.7
OnePixel p = 3 49.85 11.5 9.1 7.8
OnePixel p = 5 59.74 11.7 9.2 7.8
Table 2: Classification error (%) on the first 1000 test samples
against the black-box non-gradient based attacks.
In the case of ResNet18, it is about 35-60%. For both classi-
fiers the increase of the number of perturbed pixels (p) leads
to the increase of classification error. The use of the proposed
defense mechanism based on the KDA architecture allows to
decrease the classification error to the level of classification
on the original data or in other words it diminished the effect
of these attacks.
In summary, one can conclude that the obtained results
indicate that the KDA architecture with the proposed defense
strategy demonstrates the high robustness to the gradient and
non-gradient based attacks in the gray and black-box scenar-
ios. Moreover, it allows to improve the classification accuracy
of the vanilla classifiers. Finally, it should be pointed out that
in all cases the increase of the number of classification chan-
nels and data independent processing Pij leads to improving
the classification accuracy. However, a trade-off between the
further decrease of the classification error and the increase of
the complexity of the algorithm should be carefully addressed
that goes beyond the scope of this paper.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered the defense mechanism against
the gradient and non-gradient based gray and black-box at-
tacks. The proposed mechanism is based on the multi-channel
architecture with the randomization and the aggregation of
classification scores. It is remarkable that the architecture of
the defense is not tailored for each class of attacks and is uni-
formly used for both attacks. It is also interesting to note that
the diversified classification with the aggregation of the out-
puts of classifiers allows not only to withstand the attacks but
it also improves the accuracy of vanilla classifier. It is also
important to remark that the proposed approach is compli-
ant with the cryptographic principles when the defender has
an information advantage over the attacker. In our future re-
search, we plan to extend the aggregation mechanism to more
complex learnable strategies instead of used summation.
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